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23 August 1961

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CENTRAL

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	Communist Chi	na - Ghana: Communist Ch	nina's grant of
	an interest-free cre up a major Chinese among the new Afric and Ghana conclude	dit of nearly \$20,000,000 to foreign policy goal of winnican states. In addition to the several other agreements it to China from 14-19 August	ing support the credit, China during Pres-
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Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T009754005900120001-3 a friendship treaty, a trade agreement, and a cultural cooperation pact. Elsewhere in Africa, Peiping has previously granted a credit of \$25,000,000 to Guinea, pledged aid to the Mali Government, and extended financial support to the Algerian rebels and the Stanleyville Congo regime. Nkrumah visited the USSR prior to his arrival in China and received assurances of increased technical assistance and trade. He has now returned to the Soviet Union, possibly 25X1 for further economic negotiations. Page 10) 25X1 Dominican Republic: President Balaguer told the American consul on 21 August that increasing pressures from the Dominican military may force him to resign. He said the of-25X1 ficer corps is determined to halt his liberalization program and is demanding that the government reimpose the "old controls and system." Balaguer, who appeared more depressed than the consul had ever seen him, said flatly that he would resign rather than submit to the military demands. The President evaded questions on General Ramfis Trujillo's position, but the consul got the impression that Ramfis is 'at least going along" with the officers pressuring Balaguer. Earlier this month, Ramfis told the consul that unrest was becoming extensive in the armed forces, that Balaguer did not understand the military or command their respect, and that the] DAILY BRIEF iii 23 Aug 61

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	Sudan: The 2 demonstrators of a showdown betweents who have regovernment. The is also the most in gotiating with the ian government, of the government is Mahdi may feel the death of 12 An placed him in a position of the suday of the death	1 August clash between Sudanes the influential Ansar religious on the military regime and opposently been agitating for a returned of the Ansar sect, Siddiq in mportant figure in the opposition military rulers for a peaceful the despite protests from other opposition using the negotiations as a state at this latest police action, while sar youths as well as several position where he must make a voice the confidence of his follow	sect may force osition ele- urn to civilian al-Mahdi, who on, has been ne- cransition to civitosition figures to the contraction. The colicemen, has been igorous anti- ers.	nat
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Chinese Aid to Ghana

The credit agreement with Ghana, like the one signed with Guinea last year, does not specify projects to be aided by the Chinese but states that the credit will be used over the next five years for technical assistance and training and for purchases of machinery and equipment. Specific construction projects and training programs are to be negotiated later. Repayment of the credit, which will not begin until 1971 and will be spread over a 10-year period, will be made either in commodities or in convertible currency. The agreement brings the total of Sino-Soviet bloc economic aid to Ghana to nearly \$110,000,000.

Sino-Ghanaian trade in 1960 amounted to only \$4,345,000 and accounted for less than 1 percent of total Ghanaian trade in that year. Under the five-year trade agreement, however, commerce between the two countries is planned to reach a level of \$22,400,000 annually and to include Chinese shipments of machinery, chemicals, metals, textiles, and foodstuffs, and Ghanaian exports of cocoa beans, peanuts, coconut oil, hides and skins, and industrial diamonds. Specific information on the value of individual commodities to be exchanged was not announced but presumably trade will consist primarily of cocoa beans from Ghana and textiles and light industrial goods from China. Such trade would be advantageous to both bountries but particularly to Ghana, which has been actively seeking additional markets for its cocoa.

Nkrumah's visit to Peiping has apparently done much to bolster the relationship between the two countries; Chinese Chief of State Liu Shao-chi termed the visit a "complete success." The Ghana leader was received by Peiping's top leaders, including Mao Tse-tung. As he had done in other bloc capitals visited during his current tour, Nkrumah expressed his support for Peiping's right to UN membership and for reorganization of the UN.

This new credit to Ghana brings total Chinese aid to underdeveloped countries outside the bloc to \$378,000,000, of which less than one fifth has been drawn to date, mostly by Indonesia and

Cambodia. T	The largest s	ingle Chines	e economic cred	lits, \$84,000,-
000 and \$60,0	00,000, were	e extended to	Burma and Cul	oa respectively.
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Military Pressures May Force Dominican President's Resignation

The freedom currently being permitted opposition elements in the Dominican Republic follows a generation of enforced political quiet under the longest and most ruthless tyranny in recent Latin American history. Hostility toward the armed forces is widespread in the opposition, which includes most business and professional people. Though moderate leaders try to restrain their followers, there have been frequent public provocations of the military. Many military officers consequently feel their positions are directly threatened by the new political liberties inherent in the President's liberalization program.

On 20 August, at least two opposition leaders were killed in Santiago, the country's second largest city, either by aroused army or police officers acting independently or by mobs organized and directed by the military. The killings, which followed similar deaths in the north coast town of Sosua a week earlier, have led most businesses in Santiago to close in protest, according to information reaching the US Consulate on 21 August. The moderate National Civic Union has publicly accused "the authorities" of the murders, and many Dominicans appear convinced that the era of police repression and brutality is returning.

General Ramfis Trujillo told the consul on 21 August that incidents like those in Santiago and Sosua are to be expected as the opposition "grows stronger and incites against the military." He added that if there are attacks on military installations, "worse things will happen." Trujillo, whose past support of Balaguer has been vital, now appears in the opinion of the consul to be unprepared to take the firm action that would be required to prevent such incidents. He may estimate that if

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	he attempted to do so he would risk losing control over the armed forces.	
25X1	President Balaguer frankly told the consul on 21 August that he had been trying to deport the leaders of the pro-Castro Dominican Popular Movement, but that the military had blocked the action for "tactical" reasons, evidently in the belief that having a Communist threat in the Dominican Republic would accelerate US and OAS support for the regime. The late dictator tried this tactic on several occasions.	25X1
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THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

